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Finding Quality Evidence of Union Survivability 
in the Absence of Agency Fees: Is the Current 
Population Survey’s Public Sector Unionism 
Data Sufficiently Reliable? 
Patrick Wright† 
INTRODUCTION 
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,1 the Supreme Court held 
that it was constitutional for public-sector unions to charge non-union 
members an obligatory fee (commonly called an agency fee or less often 
a service fee) to defray the costs of contract negotiation and grievance 
administration related to a mandatory collective bargaining agreement 
that controlled the terms and conditions of the nonmembers’ employ-
ment.2 In Knox v. Service Employees International Union3 and Harris v. 
Quinn4 a majority of the Supreme Court questioned the rationale in 
Abood supporting agency fees. Specifically, the Harris majority ques-
tioned whether an agency fee was necessary in order for a state to have 
a statutory scheme supporting exclusive bargaining representatives.5 
Both Knox and Harris were decided without the need to resolve whether 
Abood remained good law. That question was directly at issue in Frie-
drichs v. California Teachers Ass’n,6 which was argued in front of the 
full court and ended in a 4-4 tie after Justice Scalia’s passing. In the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Harris, the parties’ and the amici’s briefs 
in Friedrichs, and at oral argument in Friedrichs, there was significant 
discussion about whether unions would survive without agency fees. 
This paper is meant to examine some of the major available evi-
dence to help determine whether an agency fee is necessary to satisfy 
 
 † Vice President for Legal Affairs, Mackinac Center for Public Policy. 
 1 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 2 Id. at 222. 
 3 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
 4 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2014). 
 5 Id. at 2640–41. 
 6 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) 
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the state interest in having a viable bargaining partner in the manda-
tory public-sector collective bargaining context. It begins by looking at 
the union membership data gleaned from the Current Population Sur-
vey, a monthly 60,000 household survey sponsored by the Census Bu-
reau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This survey obtains infor-
mation on employment and unemployment and includes questions on 
union membership. The accuracy of the CPS data having been ques-
tioned by an amicus in Friedrichs and others, a second method is used—
examination of state employer payroll dues and/or agency fee deduc-
tions to approximate union membership. 
This payroll methodology calls into question the reliability of some 
CPS survey data for predicting and measuring the effect of agency fees 
or lack thereof on union viability in the public sector. 
I. SYNOPSIS OF SUPREME COURT’S CASE LAW ON PUBLIC SECTOR 
BARGAINING AND UNION VIABILITY 
In Abood, Detroit teachers challenged both Michigan’s statutory 
scheme permitting exclusive representation and the agency fee provi-
sion contained therein.7 In discussing the “principle of exclusive union 
representation,” the Supreme Court stated: 
The designation of a single representative avoids the confusion 
that would result from attempting to enforce two or more agree-
ments specifying different terms and conditions of employment. 
It prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within 
the work force and eliminating the advantages to the employee 
of collectivization. It also frees the employer from the possibility 
of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits 
the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settle-
ments that are not subject to attack from rival labor organiza-
tions.8 
In discussing agency fees, the Supreme Court noted: “The tasks of ne-
gotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement and rep-
resenting the interests of employees in settling disputes and processing 
grievances are continuing and difficult ones. They often entail expendi-
ture of much time and money.”9 These tasks must be performed for both 
members and nonmembers.10 While recognizing that Michigan only 
 
 7 Abood, 431 U.S. at 212–13. 
 8 Id. at 220–21. 
 9 Id. at 221. 
 10 Id. 
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made the “use of an agency [fee] in public employment” permissive ra-
ther than mandatory, the Supreme Court held such fees are constitu-
tional since they have “been thought to distribute fairly the cost of [the 
union’s tasks] among those who benefit, and [they] counteract[] the in-
centive that employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’ to 
refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union rep-
resentation that necessarily accrue to all employees.”11 
The Supreme Court began to reexamine the Abood holding in Knox 
v. Service Employees.12 The Court stated that agency fees “constitute a 
form of compelled speech and association that imposes a ‘significant im-
pingement on First Amendment rights.’”13 It was noted that free-rider 
arguments are “generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment ob-
jections.”14 The Court explained that acceptance of the concept of “labor 
peace” to justify “compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union 
dues” was an “anomaly.”15 
In Harris v. Quinn, the Supreme Court considered whether Abood 
should be extended to allow the imposition of agency fees on personal 
care providers who were considered less than “full-fledged state em-
ployees.”16 The Harris majority holding discussed Abood’s perceived 
shortcomings at length.17 
The shortcoming that is the focus of this paper was the contention 
that exclusive representation requires agency fees: “[A] critical pillar of 
the Abood Court’s analysis rests on an unsupported empirical assump-
tion, namely, that the principle of exclusive representation is dependent 
on a union or agency shop.”18 The Supreme Court explained: 
A union’s status as exclusive bargaining agent and the right to 
collect an agency fee from non-members are not inextricably 
linked. For example, employees in some federal agencies may 
choose a union to serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for the 
unit, but no employee is required to join the union or to pay any 
union fee. Under federal law, in agencies in which unionization 
is permitted, “[e]ach employee shall have the right to form, join, 
or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such ac-
tivity, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and each 
 
 11 Id. at 222, 229. 
 12 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
 13 Id. at 2289. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 2290. 
 16 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2014). 
 17 Id. at 2632–34. 
 18 Id. at 2634. 
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employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right.” 5 
U.S.C. § 7102 (emphasis added).19 
The Harris dissenters recognized that the majority’s logic imper-
iled Abood “as to all public employees.”20 They attempted to defend the 
link between exclusive representation and agency fees. While recogniz-
ing that free-riding arguments usually fail, the dissenters noted there 
is “an essential distinction between unions and special-interest organi-
zations generally.”21 They elaborated: 
The law compels unions to represent—and represent fairly—
every worker in a bargaining unit, regardless whether they join 
or contribute to the union. That creates a collective action prob-
lem of far greater magnitude than in the typical interest group, 
because the union cannot give any special advantages to its own 
backers. In such a circumstance, not just those who oppose but 
those who favor a union have an economic incentive to withhold 
dues; only altruism or loyalty—as against financial self-inter-
est—can explain their support. Hence arises the legal rule coun-
tenancing fair-share agreements: It ensures that a union will re-
ceive adequate funding, notwithstanding its legally imposed 
disability—and so that a government wishing to bargain with an 
exclusive representative will have a viable counterpart.22 
The dissenters then questioned whether the personal care providers’ 
union would survive without agency fees and pointed to the fact that 
only around a third of federal employees who are covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement pay dues.23 They argued: 
And why, after all, should that endemic free-riding be surpris-
ing? Does the majority think that public employees are immune 
from basic principles of economics? If not, the majority can have 
no basis for thinking that absent a fair-share clause, a union can 
attract sufficient dues to adequately support its functions.24 
Thus, the dissenters defended public-sector agency fees as the only way 
a union could remain a viable exclusive representative in collective bar-
gaining with the government. 
 
 19 Id. at 2640. 
 20 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2651 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 21 Id. at 2656. 
 22 Id. (emphasis added). 
 23 Id. at 2657 n.7. 
 24 Id. at 2657. 
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Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association25 brought this issue 
directly into conflict. A group of California school teachers brought a 
direct challenge to Abood’s holding that agency fees were constitu-
tional.26 In that case, this author (representing the Mackinac Center for 
Public Policy) endeavored to test Justice Kagan’s theory in two amicus 
briefs.27 The constitutional remedy sought in Friedrichs—permitting 
exclusive representation while prohibiting agency fees—would have 
had the same practical effect as a right-to-work law. 
The briefs examined situations where two of the factors identified 
by Justice Kagan in her Harris dissent could be held constant—manda-
tory exclusive representation and the duty of fair representation (the 
requirement to treat both members and nonmembers fairly)—while the 
third—a mandatory agency fee or lack thereof—could be isolated. Given 
the state of the opposing opinions in Harris, if it could be shown that 
the effect of a lack of an agency fee would not be “too severe,”28 then the 
state interest in having a viable bargaining partner would not be suffi-
cient to overcome the nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.29 
II. THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY AS A MEANS OF EXAMINING 
UNION VIABILITY IN A RIGHT-TO-WORK SETTING 
Data on union membership and worker representation most often 
comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which describes 
itself as “the principal Federal agency responsible for measuring labor 
market activity, working conditions, and price changes in the econ-
omy.”30 “The data on union membership are collected as part of the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS), a monthly sample survey of about 60,000 
households that obtains information on employment and unemploy-
ment among the nation’s civilian noninstitutional population age 16 
 
 25 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). 
 26 Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013). 
 27 Brief of Amicus Curiae Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Support of Petitioners, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Mackinac-Cert-
Stage-Amicus-Friedrichs-v.-CTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GPG-AJJW] (certiorari brief); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Support of Petitioners, ScotusBlog (Oct. 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/14-915-tsac-Mackinac-Ctr.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/D4GW-PKMZ] (merits brief). 
 28 The two Harris opinions did not discuss what level of union membership would lead to a 
threat to viability. Both generally discussed federal employees, which the dissent claimed had a 
33% union membership rate, but neither opinion set out a constitutional threshold based on gen-
eral union membership rates. Further, there was no detailed discussion of what a union must be 
able to do to be viable, no matter what the general membership rates are. 
 29 Justice Scalia passed after oral argument in Friedrichs and the case ended in a 4-4 tie leav-
ing Abood as controlling. 
 30 About the Bureau of Labor Statistics, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/bls/info 
home.htm [https://perma.cc/2ST3-PA9R]. 
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and over.”31 The BLS indicates comparable data exists back to 1983.32 
The CPS has been described as “the principal data source from which 
researchers compile and obtain information on union membership and 
coverage for states, metropolitan areas, industries, and occupations.”33 
The Basic CPS Questionnaire34 has two labor union membership 
questions: 
 
ERNLAB 
On this job, (are/is) (name/you) a member of a labor union 
or of an employee association similar to a union? 
Yes 
No 
 
ERNCOV 
On this job, (are/is) (name/you) covered by a union or em-
ployee association contract? 
Yes 
No 
 
These questions have been in use since 1977.35 
Part B Chapter 5.C of the CPS Interviewing Manual discusses that 
portion of the interview concerning “Union Membership and Coverage 
Concepts”: 
[Y]ou ask about labor union or employee association member-
ship on the person’s sole or main job. Select “yes” for these ques-
tions if the person is a member of a labor union or an association 
that serves as a collective bargaining representative for the per-
son. 
You will ask persons who are not members of a union or em-
ployee association whether or not (s)he is covered by a union or 
employee association contract at their sole or main job. Covered 
means: there is a contract between their employer and a union 
 
 31 Economic News Release, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.bls.gov/news. 
release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/9X2H-UGEE]. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from 
the Current Population Survey: Note, 56 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 349 (2003). 
 34 BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., BASIC CPS ITEMS BOOKLET, http://www2.census.gov/programs-sur 
veys/cps/techdocs/questionnaires/Labor%20Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPM8-7A6C]. 
 35 Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 33, at 3. 
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or association that affects the wages, working conditions, and/or 
benefits at the job.36 
At the certiorari stage of Friedrichs, using BLS data, the author of 
this article compiled private-sector union membership rates among un-
ion-represented workers from 2000 through 2014 from three categories 
of states: (1) states that never had right-to-work laws during that period 
(“agency-fee states”); (2) states that have had right-to-work laws during 
that entire period; and (3) Indiana, Oklahoma, and Michigan, each of 
which has adopted a right-to-work law since 2000.37 To calculate the 
membership rate for a set of states in a given year, the number of union 
members in those states was divided by the number of workers under a 
union contract. 
Private-sector numbers were chosen partly because they were eas-
ily accessible and involved a bargaining environment with both exclu-
sive representation and a duty of fair representation—elements the 
Harris dissenters believed justified an agency fee. Private-sector data 
were also chosen because the state-by-state CPS data for private-sector 
employees allowed the impact of agency-fee requirements on union 
membership rates to be isolated by comparing states that require pri-
vate-sector agency fees with those that do not. 
In states with agency fees over the 14-year period, roughly 93% of 
union-represented private-sector employees, on average, were full un-
ion members. In mixed-status states the number was 94%, while in 
right-to-work states it was 84%.38 
 
 36 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY INTERVIEWING MANUAL B5-4 (June 
2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/CPS_Manual_June2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG 
Y3-LXBX]. 
 37 2012 Ind. Acts 7 (codified at IND. CODE §§ 22-6-6-1–13); 2012 Mich. Pub. Act No. 348 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of MICH. COMP. LAWS, ch. 423); OK. CONST., art. XXXIII, § 1A 
(passed September 2001). 
 38 The Michigan Education Association: Members, Fee Payers, and Related Income, Fiscal 
Years 2005–2014, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, http://www.mackinac.org/21020 [https:// 
perma.cc/LQ3C-6AT5] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
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At the merits stage in Friedrichs, the raw CPS data for public-sec-
tor workers were run through a statistical analysis program. This pro-
gram allowed very specific subsets to be extracted from the entire CPS 
data set, and it enabled the removal of federal employees from the CPS 
figures to thereby isolate state and local government employees’ union 
membership and union contract coverage data.39 Federal employees 
were removed since they are not governed by state and local labor laws. 
 
 39 These figures were compiled by James Sherk, then a research fellow in labor economics at 
the Heritage Foundation. The figures are available at MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, 
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The focus was placed on states that mandated not only exclusive 
representation, fair representation, and an absence of agency fees 
(right-to-work), but also had a broad scope of collective bargaining. Ul-
timately, eight states met these requirements: (1) Florida;40 (2) Idaho;41 
(3) Iowa;42 (4) Kansas;43 (5) Nebraska;44 (6) Nevada;45 (7) North Da-
kota;46 and (8) South Dakota.47 The aggregated CPS data for state and 
local government workers in these eight states yielded figures very sim-
ilar to those for private-sector employees in right-to-work states. The 
union membership rate among workers covered by public-sector collec-
tive bargaining agreements ranges in percentage from the mid-70s to 
the low-80s. 
 
UNION MEMBERSHIP RATES AMONG STATE AND GOVERNMENT WORKERS COVERED BY COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN WISCONSIN, 2000–2014, http://www.mackinac.org/archives/2015/ 
Friedrichs%20Crosstabs.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WMD-A3LV]. 
Essentially, those surveyed who indicated that they work for the government must choose 
federal, state, or local and those that chose federal were excluded. See generally question IO1GVT 
in BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., BASIC CPS ITEMS BOOKLET, supra note 34. 
 40 Florida provides for mandatory collective bargaining. FLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 447-201; FLA. 
STAT. tit. 31, § 447-609. Florida’s Constitution contains a right-to-work clause. FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 6. 
 41 Idaho allows teachers to enter into exclusive bargaining relationships with the school dis-
tricts. IDAHO CODE §§ 33-1271–33-1276. It also allows firefighters to engage in exclusive bargain-
ing. IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1801–44-1812. Idaho’s right-to-work provisions, IDAHO CODE §§ 44-2001–
44-2014, are “applicable to all employment, private and public, including all employees of the state 
and its political subdivisions.” IDAHO CODE § 44-2011. 
 42 Iowa allows mandatory public-sector bargaining. IOWA CODE §§ 20.1–20.31. Iowa has a 
right-to-work statute for its public-sector employees. IOWA CODE § 20.8(4). 
 43 Kansas allows public employees to be represented by public-sector unions in bargaining 
with public agencies. KAN. STAT. §§ 75-4321–75-4339. It has a separate statutory scheme allowing 
teachers to be represented by an exclusive bargaining representative. KAN. STAT. §§ 72-5410–72-
5437. Kansas has a right-to-work clause in its Constitution. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 12. 
 44 Nebraska allows state employees to engage in exclusive collective bargaining. NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 81-1369–81-1388. Other public employees also have the ability to engage in exclusive 
bargaining. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801–48-842. The Nebraska Constitution has three provisions 
related to right-to-work. NEB. CONST. art. XV, §§ 13–15. 
 45 Nevada allows local government employees to engage in exclusive bargaining. NEV. REV. 
STAT. §§ 288.010–288.280. Right-to-work applies to these employees. NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.140. 
 46 North Dakota allows public employees to engage in exclusive bargaining. N.D. CENT. CODE 
§§ 34-11.1-01–34-11.1-08. Public employees cannot be forced to pay agency fees. N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 34-11.1-03. North Dakota also has a statute on public school teacher bargaining. N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 15.1-16-01–15.1-16-22. Here too, right-to-work applies. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-16-07(3). 
 47 South Dakota allows exclusive public-sector bargaining. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3-18-1–3-
18-17. Right-to-work applies. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-18-2. The South Dakota Constitution also 
has a right-to-work clause. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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These 80% figures were in line with the union membership rate of 
the railway unions when the Railway Labor Act was amended to elimi-
nate voluntary unionism in 1951.48 
Thus, using the CPS method, the private sector and public sector 
right-to-work numbers were in alignment. These modern numbers also 
were roughly the same as the Railway Labor Act numbers when volun-
tary unionism was ended in 1951. 
 
 48 Commc’n Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 750 (1988) (When RLA passed, “75 to 
80% of the 1.2 million railroad industry workers belonged to one or another of the railway unions.” 
(citing H.R.Rep. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1950))). 
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III. QUESTIONS AS TO CPS METHODOLOGY 
A. Social Scientists’ Amicus Brief in Friedrichs 
In Friedrichs, three academics questioned the CPS methodology 
presented here.49 Their pertinent argument related to what they called 
the free-rider rate.50 To compute this rate, the three social science pro-
fessors expressed a preference for the School and Staffing Survey 
(SASS), which is limited to employees in elementary and secondary ed-
ucation and which is administered by the Department of Education’s 
National Center for Education Statistics, over the CPS. 
Under their analysis, the membership rate of their group 2, which 
roughly correlates to the eight states that were used in this author’s 
public sector CPS analysis, would be 66% instead of around 80%.51 So, 
they agree with the use of public employee survey data, but would have 
used a survey that showed a slightly lower union membership result. 
B. Economic Policy Institute Paper 
This author’s Friedrich amicus briefs also led to a briefing paper 
from the Economic Policy Institute authored by Jeffrey H. Keefe.52 
Keefe used CPS to indicate that: “In RTW states between 2000 and 
2014, free-riders averaged 20.3 percent of public-employee bargaining 
units.”53 After setting forth the two CPS questions related to union 
 
 49 Brief of Amici Social Scientists in Support of Respondents, Friedrichs, No. 14-915, 2015 WL 
7252638 [hereinafter Social Scientists Brief]. 
 50 As defined previously, the term “union membership rate” is the number of union members 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement divided by the total number of workers—union and 
nonunion—covered by a collective bargaining agreement. In both agency fee and right-to-work 
situations, it measures those that do not want to be union members. So, if two out of ten employees 
under a collective bargaining agreement were not members, the union membership rate would be 
80% and there would be 20% nonmembers. In their brief, the three social science professors meas-
ure the “free-rider rate” as “the number of such free-riders divided by benefiting population, which 
includes the free-riders and those contributing.” Id. at 13. In a right-to-work situation, this would 
lead to the same 80-20 split, but they would refer to it is a 20% free-rider rate instead of an 80% 
union membership rate. In an agency-fee situation, the results would be different. If eight out of 
ten were union members, the union membership rate would still remain 80% but the free-rider 
rate would drop to 0% since nonmembers would be forced to contribute an agency fee. 
 51 They use their terminology of a 34% free-rider rate, which in this circumstance is the same 
as a 66% membership rate. See id. at 23. 
 52 Jeffrey H. Keefe, On Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association: The Inextricable Links 
Between Exclusive Representation, Agency Fees, and the Duty of Fair Representation, (Economic 
Policy Institute Briefing Paper #411, Nov. 2, 2015) http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/94942.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/82LV-5XLC]. 
 53 Id. at 6. Like the social science professors, Keefe also calculates the free-rider rate as op-
posed to union membership rate. His union membership rate would be 79.7%, which was right in 
line with this author’s private and public sector right-to-work CPS calculations. 
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membership and contract coverage, he indicated that the CPS method-
ology may have some flaws. He claimed in states where mandatory pub-
lic sector bargaining is prohibited the coverage rate is too high.54 The 
second possible flaw was whether SASS should be used instead of CPS. 
Keefe states the SASS “data show that free riders are 35–40 percent of 
employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement when agency 
fees are banned, and not the 20–25 percent derived from the CPS data; 
these data discrepancies are not easily resolved.”55 
Thus, both the social scientists’ brief and the EPI paper indicated 
that SASS might be more accurate than CPS. Further, both note that 
the union membership rate for SASS in right-to-work scenarios is 
around 60 to 65% instead of 80% using the CPS method. 
IV. THE PAYROLL DEDUCTION METHODOLOGY 
The best place for information on union membership and represen-
tation would be the unions themselves. They would know how many 
people are covered under a particular collective bargaining agreement 
and the membership status of those covered. Further, given the unified 
membership and dues structures of many of the prominent public sector 
unions, the national unions would have aggregated information as well 
as information on a state-by-state basis. But, there is no union report-
ing requirement that provides all the necessary data points for deter-
mining aggregate union membership for public sector employees. 
Some unions do have to file a LM-2, which is an annual financial 
report that labor organizations are required to submit with the U.S. 
Office of Labor Management Standards.56 But, LM-2s are union specific 
and not every union has to file one. Further, in Schedule 13, which dis-
cusses membership, the LM-2s require both full members and agency 
fee payers to be set out, but there is no mention of nonmember employ-
ees who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement and pay no 
dues (essentially right-to-work).57 The CPS’s relative advantage over 
LM-2s is that it covers all workers and has a specific question on mem-
bership. 
Having considered government data from the unions (LM-2s) and 
other government data from the unionized employees (CPS), a logical 
third place to turn is to the public employers. Traditionally, many of 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 6–7. 
 56 See generally 29 C.F.R. § 403.2 
 57 DEP’T OF LABOR, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM LM-2 LABOR ORGANIZATION ANNUAL REPORT, htt 
ps://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/GPEA_Forms/LM2_Instructions_6-2016_techrev.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/8NKH-M7T8]. 
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these employers have allowed dues deductions to be made. By deter-
mining what percentage of employees that are part of a collective bar-
gaining unit has dues deducted for the union, it might be possible to 
ascertain a union membership percentage floor. But, there are thou-
sands of public-sector employers in the United States. Obtaining infor-
mation from all these employers would be too daunting of a task. There-
fore, the payroll-deduction information was sought for state employees 
(from all 50 states). Many of the states use a centralized payroll system 
for state employees even if the employees work in numerous depart-
ments. This made data accumulation easier.58 
There are some drawbacks with a paycheck-withdrawal methodol-
ogy. For instance, while a particular state with mandatory bargaining 
may allow paycheck withdrawals, there may be no requirement that the 
union and public employer agree to such in any particular collective 
bargaining agreement. Further, many states require an employee pro-
vide affirmative consent before a payroll deduction is allowed. Some em-
ployees who do not give this consent may be paying dues or agency fees 
by other methods. Thus, the union membership figure derived through 
the payroll method is at least a membership “floor”—a low-end bound-
ary condition not based on estimates or surveys for how many public-
sector union members are in a state.59 
Generally categorizing the state bargaining laws and setting forth 
their paycheck withdrawal schemes will help provide context to the 
paycheck-withdrawal survey results. The first category has states that 
have mandatory bargaining and permit agency fees.60 States in the se-
cond category have mandatory bargaining, but have no agency fees.61 
One state, Wisconsin, has mandatory bargaining, no agency fees, and 
no dues deduction and constitutes a third category. States in the fourth 
category largely prohibit mandatory collective bargaining yet permit 
“voluntary dues” (here generally defined as dues not required under the 
union security clause of a collective bargaining agreement). The fifth 
 
 58 Many states have state universities with their own payroll and governing structure. To 
avoid the complications of having to navigate all of these, university employees were not included 
within the instant survey. The university employees are included within the CPS count of state 
employees, however, which will mean that the CPS is looking at all state employees and the payroll 
method is looking at all non-university state employees. 
 59 The author would like to thank research assistant Justin Davis for handling the overwhelm-
ing majority of the calls and also the various state officials who took time to understand the nu-
anced issues and to provide their assistance. 
 60 To the extent that a rough comparable for this category is sought under the previously com-
puted CPS method, the best one would be private sector agency fee states that came in with a 
union membership percentage around 93%. No CPS numbers were previously computed for public 
sector agency fee states. 
 61 A rough comparable for this category would be the eight states that had broad public sector 
bargaining without agency fees. 
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category has states with no mandatory bargaining and prohibit volun-
tary dues collection. 
For comparison’s sake, a new custom cut of CPS data was gener-
ated—that of state employees. A table of the results from that CPS data 
for each category is followed by the payroll methodology. 
A. States With Mandatory Bargaining, Agency Fees, and Dues 
Collection 
The states in this category are: 
(1) Alaska;62 
(2) California;63 
(3) Connecticut;64 
(4) Delaware;65 
 
 62 Alaska allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.250(5)–
(7). Union dues and agency fees may be collected by the state. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.220; see also 
ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.225 (discussing collective bargaining agreements that include “a union shop 
or agency shop provision”). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained through an email. Email from Kim Garrett, Emp. Plan-
ning & Info. Ctr. Manager, Div. of Pers. and Labor Relations, State of Alaska, Dep’t of Admin., to 
Justin A. Davis (Sept. 29, 2016, 07:48 EST) (on file with author). For total employment numbers, 
see ALASKA DEP’T OF ADMIN., DIV. OF PERS. AND LABOR RELATIONS, STATE OF ALASKA WORKFORCE 
PROFILE FISCAL YEAR 2016, http://doa.alaska.gov/dop/fileadmin/DOP_Home/pdf/dopannualreport. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/8U78-W849]. 
 63 California allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3513, 
3515. Those same provisions permit agency fees. Id. California permits deductions for dues and 
agency fees. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3515.6. 
Its payroll deductions numbers were provided by email. Email from Frolan R. Aguiling, 
Chief Counsel for the California Dep’t of Human Res., to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 18, 2016, 06:53 EST) 
(on file with author). The numbers were compiled from the PDB4707R Report for the December 
2015 Pay Period. For total state employee numbers, see CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF FIN., SCHEDULE 4: 
POSITIONS AND SALARY COST ESTIMATES AT 2016 BUDGET ACT, http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2016- 
17/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/BS_SCH4.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3CM-VVML]. 
 64 Connecticut allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-270. 
Agency fee and dues deductions are permitted. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-280. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained in a series of emails. Email from Natalie A. Braswell, 
Esq., Assistant Comptroller and Gen. Counsel, Connecticut Office of the State Comptroller, to Jus-
tin A. Davis (Sept. 30, 2016, 09:14 EST); Id. (Oct. 12, 2016, 01:21 EST); Id. (Oct. 12, 2016, 01:23 
EST); Id. (Oct. 12, 2016, 01:42 EST) (all on file with author). 
 65 Delaware allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 
§ 1302(o) and (p). Delaware permits deductions for dues and agency fees. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 
§ 1319. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained in an email. Email from Brenda Lakeman, Dir. of Human 
Res. Mgmt. and Statewide Benefits at the Delaware Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to Justin A. Davis 
(Dec. 23, 2016, 02:03 EST) (on file with author). 
Ms. Lakeman explained a discrepancy in the Delaware numbers: “The reason that the em-
ployees with a Union deduction is higher than those appearing covered [by a collect bargaining 
agreement] is that many School job records do NOT show the union code, but yet the employees 
are correctly set up to have the DSEA deduction taken. Unfortunately that is what the data 
shows.” 
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(5) Hawaii;66 
(6) Illinois;67 
(7) Maine;68 
(8) Maryland;69 
(9) Massachusetts;70 
(10) Minnesota;71 
 
 66 Hawaii allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-2. Hawaii 
permits agency fees. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-3. Hawaii allows payroll deductions, but charges each 
employee full dues and makes any agency-fee payer seek a rebate outside the payroll-deduction 
process. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-4. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained from the HAWAII DEP’T OF HUMAN RES. DEV., STATE OF 
HAWAII EXEC. BRANCH WORKFORCE PROFILE 1–2, https://dhrd.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/12/Executive-Branch-Workforce-Profile-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VN7-HEQU]. 
 67 Illinois allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3. Agency 
fees are permitted. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(a), (e). Payroll deductions for dues and agency fees 
are allowed. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(f). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Robert P. Osgood, Staff Attorney, 
Illinois Office of the Comptroller, to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 7, 2016, 10:37 EST) (on file with author). 
 68 Maine allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 979-A. 
Agency fees are permitted. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 979-B. Payroll deductions are covered by ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 11. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Avery T. Day, Chief Legal Counsel, 
Office of Maine Governor Paul LePage, to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 5, 2016, 08:49 EST); Email from 
Avery T. Day, Chief Legal Counsel, Office of Maine Governor Paul LePage, to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 
14, 2016, 10:31 EST) (both on file with author). 
 69 Maryland allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. 
& PENS. § 3-102. Agency fees are permitted. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 3-502(b)(1). 
Maryland allows dues to be withheld after a written request from the employee. MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-403. 
Its total state employment number is from MARYLAND DEP’T OF BUDGET AND MGMT., 
ANNUAL PERSONNEL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 3 http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/employ 
ees/Documents/AnnualPersonnelReportFY15.pdf Annual [https://perma.cc/L4TH-XCNC]. Its pay-
roll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Catherine Hackman, Deputy Exec. Dir., Mary-
land Dep’t of Mgmt. and Budget, to Patrick J. Wright (January 11, 2017, 03:46 EST) (on file with 
author). 
 70 Massachusetts allows state employees to engage in mandatory bargaining for state employ-
ees. MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 150E, § 1. Agency fees are permitted. MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 
150E, § 12. With an employee’s written permission, agency fees can be collected as part of a payroll 
withdrawal. MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 180, § 17G. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Greg McKinney, Labor Relations 
Advisor, Massachusetts Office of Emp. Relations, to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 23, 2016, 10:09 EST) 
(on file with author). Of the 1,993 covered employees not paying full dues through payroll, 176 are 
agency fee payers who are paying those fees through payroll deductions. Id. 
 71 Minnesota allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. MINN. STAT. § 179A.03. 
Agency fees are permissible. MINN. STAT. § 179A.06. While it is clear that payroll deductions for 
agency fees exist, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE EMPLOYEE UNION FAIR SHARE FEE 
CALCULATIONS, http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/fairshare.pdf [https://perma.cc/M 
Y5E-TWM6], the statutory or administrative basis for this is unclear. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Carolyn J. Trevis, Assistant State 
Negotiator, Labor Relations Div., Minnesota Mgmt. & Budget, to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 17, 2016) 
(on file with author). Minnesota also put out an audit report of fair share fees that contains similar 
information, but that came out in 2013. Office of the Legislative Auditor, State Employee Union 
Fair Share Fee Calculations. 
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(11) Missouri;72 
(12) Montana;73 
(13) New Hampshire;74 
(14) New Jersey;75 
(15) New Mexico;76 
(16) New York;77 
 
 72 Missouri allows state employees to engage collective bargaining. MO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 105.500–105.510. But, that bargaining is limited to “meet, confer and discuss . . . proposals.” 
While there is no explicit mention of agency fees in the bargaining statute, such fees are permis-
sible. Schaffer v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis, 869 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Upon a 
state employee’s written authorization, dues can be withheld. MO. REV. STAT. § 33.103. 
Until 2007, collective bargaining agreements were revocable at will by the public employer. 
Indep. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131 (Mo. 2007). Until 2012, a public 
employer had no duty to bargain in good faith. Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360 
(Mo. 2012). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Guy R. Krause, OA/Div. of Pers. 
Research Assoc., Pay, Leave and Reporting Section, to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 3, 2016, 02:56 EST) 
(on file with author). 
 73 Montana allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-103. 
Upon an employee’s written authorization, dues may be withdrawn. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-
203. Montana has an indirect reference to agency fees that implies that such are permissible. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-402. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Therese Simpson, Senior Human 
Res. Analyst, Montana Dep’t of Admin. to Michael Manion, Chief Legal Counsel, Montana Dep’t 
of Admin. (Oct. 11, 2016, 01:55 MST) (on file with author). 
 74 New Hampshire allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 273-A:1. While agency fees are not explicitly mentioned in New Hampshire’s public sector bar-
gaining statute, such fees are a permissible subject of bargaining under N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 273-A:3. Nashua Teachers Union v. Nashua Sch. Dist., 707 A.2d 448, 450–51 (1998). Upon writ-
ten request, an employee may have dues deducted from their paycheck. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 275:48. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Matthew Newland, Manager of 
Emp. Relations, New Hampshire Div. of Pers., to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 28, 2016, 04:00 EST) (on 
file with author). 
 75 New Jersey allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-3. 
Agency fees are not only permitted, but may be imposed if the employer does not agree to them. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.5. Without individual employee approval, collective bargaining agents 
may demand agency fees and dues be subject to an automatic payroll withdrawal. N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 34:13A-5.6. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Nadia Jordan, Office of Mgmt. and 
Budget, Centralized Payroll, New Jersey Dep’t of Treasury, to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 7, 2016, 10:36 
EST); Email from Nadia Jordan, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Centralized Payroll, New Jersey 
Dep’t of Treasury, to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 26, 2016, 02:59 EST). 
 76 New Mexico allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-4. 
Agency fees are permissible. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 10-7E-9(G). Payroll deductions of dues are allowed, 
unless an employee objects in writing. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 10-7E-17. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Sandy Martinez, State Pers. Of-
ficer, New Mexico Div. Dir. of Labor Relations to Justin R. Najaka, New Mexico State Pers. Dir. 
(Oct. 6, 2016, 01:36 PST) (on file with author). 
 77 New York permits state employees to engage in mandatory collective bargaining. N.Y. CIV. 
SERV. § 204; N.Y. CIV. SERV. § 2(5). Agency fees are permissible. N.Y. CIV. SERV. § 208(3)(b). Upon 
the employee’s written request, dues may be deducted. N.Y. CIV. SERV. § 208(1)(b). Agency fees are 
automatically deducted. N.Y. CIV. SERV. § 208(3)(b). 
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(17) Ohio;78 
(18) Oregon;79 
(19) Pennsylvania;80 
(20) Rhode Island;81 
(21) Vermont;82 and 
(22) Washington.83 
 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via a freedom of information request. New York Office 
of State Comptroller, Freedom of Information Law Request #2016-507 (Nov. 29, 2016) (on file with 
author). Within the 36,355 not paying dues by paycheck withdrawal, there are 35,607 agency fee 
payers. Id. 
 78 Ohio allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01. 
Agency fees are permitted. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(C). Payroll deductions of agency fees 
do not require the employee’s written authorization. Id. The total employee and collective bargain-
ing membership numbers can be found at DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., MONTHLY REPORT—NUMBER 
OF STATE EMPLOYEES (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.das.ohio.gov/Portals/0/DASDivisions/HumanRe 
sources/pdf/Trends%20Reports-8-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/73VE-MYQZ]. The payroll numbers 
were received via email. Kevin Milstead, DAS Human Res. Div., Ohio Dep’t of Admin. Serv., to 
Justin A. Davis (Oct. 20, 2016, 07:49 EST) (on file with author). 
 79 Oregon allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.650. Agency 
fees are permitted, but union security agreements are sometimes subject to a separate vote from 
the general collective bargaining agreement. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.650(10). Upon written request 
of an employee, payroll deductions for dues is proper. OR. REV. STAT. § 292.055. Payroll deductions 
for agency fees do not require a written authorization. Id. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Matthew Shelby, Communications 
Strategist, Oregon Office of the Chief Operating Officer to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 11, 2016 07:36 
PST) (on file with author). 
 80 Pennsylvania allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. 43 PA. CONST. STAT. 
§ 1101.301. Agency fees are permissible. 43 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1102.3. Agency fees may be col-
lected with a notice to the employer. I43 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1102.4. 
Its total state employee number (for 2016) can be found at Workforce Statistics, SEC’Y OF 
ADMIN., http://www.oabis.state.pa.us/SGWS/2016/SGWS_MAIN.html, then clicking “Overall 
Complement” and then clicking “Union/Management Status” and adding the entries. The remain-
ing payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Wha Lee Strohecker, Agency Open Re-
corders Officer, Pennsylvania Governor’s Office of Admin., to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 2, 2016, 02:54 
EST). 
 81 Rhode Island allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-1. 
Nonmembers must pay an agency fee that is deducted from their paychecks. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-
11-2. Union dues can be withheld upon an employee request. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-6-17. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Melanie Marcaccio, Acting Exec. 
Dir. of Human Res./Pers. Admin., Rhode Island Dep’t of Admin., to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 14, 2016, 
at 04:26 EST); Email from Melanie Marcaccio, Acting Exec. Dir. of Human Res./Pers. Admin., 
Rhode Island Dep’t of Admin., to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 31, 2016, at 08:19 EST) (on file with author). 
 82 Vermont allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 902. 
Agency fees are permitted. Id. at § 902(19). Agency fees and dues can be gathered through payroll 
deduction. Id. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Amerin Aborjaily, Records Officer, 
Vermont Dep’t of Human Res., to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 8, 2016, 10:18 EST); Email from Amerin 
Aborjaily, Records Officer, Vermont Dep’t of Human Res., to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 21, 2016, 09:58 
EST) (on file with author). 
 83 Washington allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 41.80.005. Agency fees are permitted. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.100. Both fees and dues can be 
deducted at a collective bargaining agent’s request. Id. 
The total number of state employees is from a website. Number of Employees and Headcount 
Trends, OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., http://hr.ofm.wa.gov/workforce-data-planning/workforce-data-
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trends/number-employees-and-headcount-trends [https://perma.cc/23NY-DEAZ]. Its payroll num-
bers were obtained by email. Emails from Nathan Sherrard, Assistant Legal Affairs Counsel, 
Washington Office of Fin. Mgmt., to Justin A. Davis (Jan. 16, 2017, 09:31 EST) (on file with au-
thor); Id. (Nov. 1, 2016, 06:06 EST) (on file with author). 
22 WRIGHT PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/17  8:50 PM 
563] FINDING EVIDENCE OF UNION SURVIVABILITY 581 
 
 
 
Before comparing the CPS numbers with the payroll method, some 
anomalies in the payroll method must be explored. Remember that pay-
roll methodology is supposed to set a membership floor. Yet Alaska, Ha-
waii, Maryland and Montana are all at 100%, and Delaware is at 
22 WRIGHT PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/17  8:50 PM 
582  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
102.9%. Delaware is a data tracking error.84 Hawaii makes any agency-
fee payer seek a rebate outside the payroll process.85 With Alaska, Mar-
yland, and Montana, the problem appears to be errors in the data pro-
vided. 
Those anomalies aside, both the CPS and payroll methods show 
union membership rates above 80% when the states are aggregated. 
The CPS’s membership rate is nearly 15% higher at 94.5%. Remember-
ing that payroll methodology is supposed to operate as a floor, the re-
sults do not seem inconsistent with each other. 
B. Mandatory Bargaining, No Agency Fees, and Dues Collection 
These states are: 
(1) Colorado;86 
(2) Florida;87 
(3) Iowa;88 
 
 84 Delaware’s payroll numbers were obtained in an email. Email from Brenda Lakeman, Dir. 
of Human Res. Mgmt. and Statewide Benefits at the Delaware Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to 
Justin A. Davis (Dec. 23, 2016, 02:03 EST) (on file with author). 
Ms. Lakeman explained a discrepancy in the Delaware numbers: “The reason that the em-
ployees with a Union deduction is higher than those appearing covered [by a collect bargaining 
agreement] is that many School job records do NOT show the union code, but yet the employees 
are correctly set up to have the DSEA deduction taken. Unfortunately, that is what the data 
shows.” 
 85 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 89.4. 
 86 Since 2007, Colorado allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. Colo. Exec. Order 
No. D 028 07 (Nov. 2, 2007). The executive order does not specifically permit agency fees. Id. This 
order also permits state employee unions to collect dues through payroll. Id. at II(E). COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 24-50-104(e) and (f). 
Its total employment number was obtained by email. Email of Jolina Lewis, Open Records 
Request Liaison, Colorado Exec. Dir.’s Office, to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 18, 2016, 12:20 EST) (on file 
with author). Its payroll coverage number was obtained by compiling all of the eligible employees 
from Colorado’s eight 2008 state employee bargaining unit certification elections. 
 87 Florida allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. FLA. STAT. § 447.203. As noted 
above, Florida’s Constitution contains a right-to-work clause. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6. Collection of 
union dues is allowed. FLA. STAT. § 447.303. 
Florida also has a unique manner in which it resolves impasses with regard to state em-
ployees in the public sector. If an impasse occurs between the Governor and a collective bargaining 
agent, either party notifies the Florida Public Relations Commission and the matter is then for-
warded to the state Legislature for resolution. FLA. STAT. § 447.403. The “legislative body shall 
take such action as it deems to be in the public interest, including the interest of the public em-
ployees involved, to resolve all disputed impasse issues.” FLA. STAT. § 447.403(d). Thus, the state 
Legislature has almost unlimited discretion in resolving these disputes. This may help explain its 
low union membership rate under the payroll method. 
Its total employment number were obtained via email. Email from Jill Hough, Gov’t Ana-
lyst, Florida Bureau of State Payrolls, to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 3, 2016, 03:10 EST) (on file with 
author). The payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from James J. Parry, Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel, Florida Dep’t Mgmt. Serv., to Patrick J. Wright (Sept. 13, 2016, 03:53 EST) (on file 
with author). 
 88 Iowa allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. IOWA CODE § 20.3. Agency fees are 
prohibited. IOWA CODE § 20.8(4). Iowa permits dues checkoffs, but such checkoffs require a written 
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(4) Kansas;89 
(5) Michigan;90 
(6) Nebraska;91 
(7) North Dakota;92 and 
(8) South Dakota.93 
 
request from the employee. IOWA CODE § 20.9. 
Its total employment number was obtained via email. Email from Tami Wiencik, Legislative 
Liaison/Pub. Info. Officer, Iowa Dep’t of Admin. Officer, to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 16, 2016, O6:19 
P.M. EST) (on file with author). The payroll numbers were also obtained via email. Email from 
Tami Wiencik, Legislative Liaison/Pub. Info. Officer, Iowa Dep’t of Admin. Officer to, Patrick J. 
Wright (Oct. 7, 2016, 11:41 EST) (on file with author). 
 89 Kansas allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4432. Kan-
sas has a right-to-work clause in its Constitution. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 12. Kansas has payroll 
deduction, but such checkoffs require a written request from the employee. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-
5501(d). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from John Yeary, Kansas Dep’t of Ad-
min., to Justin A. Davis (Dec. 16, 2016, 05:52 EST) (on file with author). 
 90 Michigan’s state employees are governed by the State Civil Service Commission. MICH. 
CONST. art. XI, § 5. Mandatory collective bargaining is allowed, but agency fees are not permitted. 
United Auto Workers v. Green, 870 N.W.2d 867, 876 (2015). Before Green, agency fees were per-
mitted and the Michigan Civil Service Commission could withhold dues and agency fees upon an 
employee’s written consent. Mich. Civ. Serv. Comm’n Rule 6.7. 
Both its total employment and payroll numbers are from the MICH. CIV. SERV., ANNUAL 
WORKFORCE REPORT THIRD QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2015–16, table 5-2, http://www.michigan.gov/ 
documents/mdcs/WF_2016_3rd_Quarter_Complete_528226_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULD7-UUJ8]. 
 91 Nebraska allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. NEB. REV. Stat. §§ 81-1369–
81-1388. Dues deduction appears to be on a contract-by-contract basis. See LABOR CONTRACT (July 
1, 2015 – June 30, 2017) 4, http://nlcs1.nlc.state.ne.us/epubs/P2000/T002-201517.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/4VRV-TNM5]. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email from Melissa Lee Trueblood, Econ. De-
velopment Research Manager, Nebraska Dep’t of Econ. Development, to Justin A. Davis (Novem-
ber 4, 2016, 01:46 EST) (on file with author); Email from William Wood, Chief Negotiator/Adm’r, 
Nebraska Dep’t Admin. Serv., to Patrick J. Wright (Sept. 16, 2016, 03:45 EST) (on file with author). 
 92 North Dakota allows state employees to engage in mandatory bargaining. N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 34-11.1-01. But, these employees cannot be forced to pay agency fees. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-
05(3). An employee can request that their dues be withheld from their paycheck. N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 34-11.1-03. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by telephone. Telephone interview by Justin A. Davis 
with Tina M. Bauer, North Dakota  State Payroll Manager (Oct. 28, 2016). 
 93 South Dakota allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-
18-1. Agency fees are prohibited. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-18-2. Dues deductions are permitted 
upon an employee’s written authorization. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-10-8; S.D. ADMIN. R. 
39:03:01:03. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Tony Venhuizen, Chief of Staff to 
South Dakota Governor Dennis M. Daugaard to Justin A. Davis (Nov. 16, 2016 03:07 MST) (on file 
with author). 
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In contrast to the figures for the category 1 states, the difference 
between union membership rate under the CPS method and the payroll 
method is stark. In category 2, the difference in membership rates is 
sizable at 54.6% with the CPS method at 83.2% and the payroll method 
at 28.6%. Note too that Michigan only clearly entered this category as 
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a result of a 2015 court case.94 Its exclusion would drop the aggregate 
union membership floor under the payroll method to 17.1%. 
Category 2 is essentially mandatory bargaining with right-to-work, 
which is essentially the constitutional remedy that was being sought in 
Friedrichs. Category 2 will be discussed more fully below. 
C. Mandatory Bargaining, No Agency Fees, No Dues Collection 
The sole state with these characteristics is Wisconsin.95 
 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin’s unique public bargaining laws seemingly prevent its 
experience from providing much guidance nationally. 
D. No Mandatory Bargaining and Voluntary Dues Collection 
The states in this group are: 
(1) Arizona;96 
 
 94 Supra note 90. 
 95 Wisconsin allows mandatory bargaining for state employees. WIS. STAT. § 111.82. The scope 
of that bargaining is quite limited, however. WIS. STAT. § 111.91. Agency fees are prohibited. WIS. 
STAT. § 111.85. Dues deductions are also generally prohibited. WIS. STAT. § 111.845. Police, how-
ever, can have dues, agency fees, and payroll deductions. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from John M. Wiesman, Compensation 
Specialist, Wisconsin Dep’t of Admin., to Justin A. Davis (Dec. 7, 2016, 10:47 EST) (on file with 
author). Those under the “Payroll Coverage” and “Payroll Union Members” entries are just state 
police. Id. 
 96 Arizona does not permit state employees to engage in mandatory collective bargaining. Vol-
untary deductions for union dues are permitted. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-612(C)(3). But, it generally 
had banned payroll deductions “for political purposes.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-361-02. There were 
some state employees that were exempted from the ban. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-361-02(H). The ban 
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(2) Arkansas;97 
(3) Idaho;98 
(4) Indiana;99 
(5) Kentucky;100 
(6) Louisiana;101 
(7) Mississippi;102 
(8) Nevada;103 
(9) North Carolina;104 
 
was declared unconstitutional. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Bennett, 934 
F.Supp.2d 1167 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Kevin Donnellan, Deputy Dir., 
Arizona Dep’t of Admin., to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 14, 2016, 01:16 EST) (on file with author). 
 97 Arkansas does not have mandatory bargaining for state employees. Voluntary union dues 
can be withheld. ARK. CODE §§ 19-4-1602(7), (9). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained email. Email from Vicki Mills, Assistant Pers. Adm’r, 
Payroll, Arkansas Dep’t of Fin. and Admin., to Patrick J. Wright (Feb. 2, 2017, 11:51 EST) (on file 
with author). 
 98 Idaho does not allow state employee bargaining. Payroll dues deductions are permitted with 
an employee’s written authorization. IDAHO CODE § 44-2004(1); IDAHO CODE § 44-2011. But payroll 
deductions for union political activities are prohibited. IDAHO CODE § 44-2004(2). This payroll-
deduction ban due to political activity ban was upheld by the Supreme Court. Ysursa v. Pocatello 
Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Audrey Musgrave, Deputy State 
Controller, Office of Idaho State Controller, to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 5, 2016, 02:52 EST) (on file 
with author). 
 99 Indiana banned mandatory collective bargaining for state employees in 2005. Ind. Exec. 
Order 05-14 (January 11, 2005). Payroll dues deductions are permitted. IND. CODE § 22-2-6-2(b)(5). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Brent Plunkett, Payroll Dir., Indiana 
Office of State Auditor, to Justin A. Davis (Dec. 2, 2016, 04:20 EST) (on file with author). 
 100 Kentucky does not have mandatory state employee bargaining. Kentucky allows payroll 
deductions for union dues. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.060. 
Its payroll numbers were not obtained. 
 101 Louisiana allows a limited group of state employees (state police and corrections employees) 
to engage in mandatory collective bargaining. LA. CONST. art. X, pt. IV § 48(A)(3). Louisiana’s Dep’t 
of Admin. is in charge of a “central automated payroll system,” LA. STAT. ANN. § 39:86, which is 
done through the Office of State Uniform Payroll. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Public Records Request, Louisiana 
Div. of Admin. to Patrick J. Wright (Feb. 14, 2017, 04:38 EST). 
 102 Mississippi does not allow mandatory state employee bargaining. Voluntary dues deduc-
tions are permitted. Mississippi Office of Attorney General, Letter to Rep. Green (May 30, 1990), 
1990 WL 548001. 
Its total state employee number was obtained by email. Email of Chuck McIntosh, Missis-
sippi Dep’t of Fin. and Admin., to Justin A. Davis (Dec. 15, 2016, 05:02 EST) (on file with author). 
Its number of dues payers was obtained by email. Email of Chuck McIntosh, Mississippi Dep’t of 
Fin. and Admin., Patrick J. Wright (Feb, 13, 2017, 11:15 EST) (on file with author). 
 103 As noted above, Nevada had broad public sector bargaining, but that does not include state 
employees. Right-to-work applies to the public employees that can engage in public bargaining. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.140. Nevada allows state employees to have union dues deducted from their 
paychecks. NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.129. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Mary Woods, Pub. Info. Officer, 
Nevada Dep’t of Admin., to Justin A. Davis (Sept. 30, 2016, 10:47 PST) (on file with author). 
 104 North Carolina bans mandatory bargaining for state and local public employees. N.C. GEN. 
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(10) Oklahoma;105 
(11) South Carolina;106 
(12) Tennessee;107 
(13) Texas;108 
(14) Utah;109 
(15) Virginia;110 
(16) West Virginia;111 and 
 
STAT. § 95-98. Despite, this ban, voluntary dues payments through paycheck withdrawals are per-
mitted. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-426.40A(g). 
Its state employee number was obtained by email. Email from Paula Woodhouse, Interim 
Dir., North Carolina Office of State Human Res., to Justin A. Davis (Dec. 17, 09:54 EST) (on file 
with author). Its payroll numbers are from an audit report. NORTH CAROLINA OFFICE OF STATE 
AUDITOR, EMP. ASS’NS — REPORT OF MEMBERSHIP COUNT 3 (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.ncaudi 
tor.net/EPSWeb/Reports/FiscalControl/FCA-2014-9202.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MEA-5HYW]. 
 105 Oklahoma does not permit state employees to engage in mandatory collective bargaining. 
State employees whose union has at least 2000 members may have their dues withheld from their 
paycheck. OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, § 34.70. 
Its payroll numbers were not obtained. 
 106 South Carolina does not have mandatory collective bargaining for public employees. Branch 
v. City of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d 289, 292 (S.C. 2000). It does allow for voluntary dues with-
drawals. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-11-83. 
Its payroll numbers were not obtained. 
 107 Tennessee does not permit mandatory collective bargaining for state employees. Tennessee 
allows payroll deductions for union dues. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-23-204. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained by email. Email from Ashley Fuqua, Legislative Liaison 
& Pub. Info. Officer, to Patrick J. Wright (Feb. 10, 2017, 10:06 EST) (on file with author); Email 
from Ashley Fuqua, Legislative Liaison & Pub. Info. Officer, to Justin A. Davis (Feb. 2, 2017, 01:15 
EST) (on file with author). 
 108 Texas prohibits mandatory collective bargaining by state employees. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 617.002. Upon written authorization, state employees may have their dues withdrawn. Texas 
Office of Attorney General, Opinion No. MW-130 (January 25, 1980). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via letter. Letter from James G. Nolan, Assoc. Deputy 
Gen. Counsel, Texas Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, to Annie Spilman, NFIB/Texas Legislative Dir. 
(Nov. 29, 2016) (on file with author). 
 109 Utah does not have mandatory state employee bargaining. Utah allows voluntary dues de-
ductions upon the employee’s written request. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-32-1. But payroll deductions 
for union political activities are prohibited. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-32-1.1. This payroll-deduction 
ban due to political activity ban was upheld by the Tenth Circuit. Utah Educ. Ass’n v. Shurtleff, 
565 F.3d (10th Cir. 2009). 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email of Mark Austin, Utah State Payroll 
Manager, to Patrick J. Wright (Dec. 30, 2016, 12:53 EST) (on file with author). 
 110 Virginia bans mandatory collective bargaining for state employees. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-
57.2. While there is no statutory basis, voluntary dues withholdings are allowed. 
Its total employment number was obtained by email. Email of Felix Sarfo-Kantanka, Jr., 
Deputy Sec’y of Admin., Office of Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe, to Justin A. Davis (Oct. 6, 
2016, 02:06 EST) (on file with author). Payroll withholding numbers were obtained by email. Email 
of Doug Page, Dir. Fin. and Admin., Virginia Dep’t of Accounts, to Justin A. Davis (Feb. 1, 2017) 
(on file with author). 
 111 West Virginia does not permit state employees to engage in mandatory collective bargain-
ing. It does allow state employees to have voluntary dues deducted. W. VA. CODE § 12-3-13B. 
Its payroll numbers were obtained via email. Email of Joe. F. Thomas, Acting Director, West 
Virginia Div. of Pers., to Justin A. Davis (October 27, 2016, 03:15 EST) (on file with author). 
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(17) Wyoming.112 
 
 
 
 
 112 Wyoming does not allow state employees to engage in mandatory collective bargaining. Wy-
oming permits state employees to have voluntary dues deducted. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-3-101(e); 
Wyoming Public Employees Ass’n, WPEA POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (PAC) ENROLLMENT 
FORM, http://www.womingpublicemployees.org/site buildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/enrollmentcard 
002.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3UY-QKBC]. 
Its state employee number was obtained by email. Email of Lori Eichheim, Wy. Admin. & 
Info. Human Res. Div., to Justin A. Davis (Dec. 21, 2016 02:40 MST) (on file with author). 
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By definition, all of the “CPS coverage” numbers in category 4 
should be zero since these states do not allow state employee mandatory 
bargaining. The fact that they are not likely means there is a problem 
in the manner the CPS frames its union membership and union cover-
age questions. According to the CPS Interviewing Manual, the “CPS 
Union Members” numbers should also be zero since the employees are 
not members of “a labor organization that serves as a collective bargain-
ing agent for the person” because there is no mandatory bargaining and 
therefore no collective bargaining representative. 
Also, note the differences between the total employee numbers. Un-
der the CPS method, there are over 2.5 million state employees, while 
under the payroll methodology there are about 750,000. Some of this 
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difference can be accounted for due to the CPS including state univer-
sity employees, yet it is doubtful that there are 1.75 million state uni-
versity employees that would thereby fully account for the difference. 
E. No Mandatory Bargaining and At Least Some Limits to  
State-Assisted Dues Collection 
The states in this category are Alabama113 and Georgia.114 
 
 
 
 
 
 113 Alabama does not permit state employees to engage in mandatory collective bargaining. 
There are some conflicting statutes on dues withdrawals. ALA. CODE. § 36-1-4.3(a) specifically al-
lows withdrawal for “membership dues.” A withdrawal can be cancelled by the employee after two 
months’ notice. Id. But, in 2010, Alabama prohibited state and local government from collecting 
dues for entities that engage in “political activity.” ALA. CODE § 17-17-5(b). Because most unions 
engage in some sort of political activity, dues withdrawals for them are generally banned. The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected a facial challenge to the ban. Alabama Educ. Ass’n v. State Superinten-
dent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014). 
Its state employee numbers were obtained by email. Email from Kathleen Baxter, Alabama 
Deputy State Comptroller, to Justin A. Davis (Dec. 12, 2016, 06:51 EST) (on file with author). 
 114 Georgia bans state employees from payroll deductions for union dues. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-
7-54(e). 
Its state employee number was obtained by email. Email from Nicole Long, Dir., Compen-
sation and Benefits, Georgia Human Res. Admin., to Justin A. Davis (Dec. 15, 2016, 01:28 EST) 
(on file with author). 
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In category 5, there is also the same volume of total employees is-
sue that arose in category 4. Under the CPS methodology there are 
nearly three times as many state employees and, again, it is unlikely 
that state university employees can make up the difference. As in cate-
gory 4, the “CPS coverage” and “CPS Union Members” numbers should 
be zero and are not. 
V. UNION VIABILITY IN LIGHT OF FINDINGS 
The payroll methodology raises the question whether there are se-
rious flaws with the CPS data that is being accumulated in relation to 
public sector unionism, which may undercut that specific subset of CPS 
data’s use in assessing union viability. But the payroll methodology also 
provides some new evidence that unions can survive without agency 
fees. 
The first issue is the CPS data. The gap in union membership in 
category 2 between the CPS method and the payroll method is massive. 
Before entirely discounting the CPS, it should be noted that its union 
membership percentage from 2000 to 2014 (80%) is closer to the SASS 
figure (66%) than is the payroll union membership percentage. Further, 
the CPS union membership rate is in line with the union membership 
rate in existence when the Railway Labor Act was amended. 
But, the differences discussed in Categories 2, 4, and 5 seem to in-
dicate there must be some fault with the CPS. While I have taken the 
position that the CPS labor questions and the explanatory guide mean 
that union membership should only occur where there is mandatory 
bargaining, perhaps many of those being interviewed and performing 
the interviews fail to understand the significance of the mandatory bar-
gaining portion of the labor questions and are claiming or recording un-
ion membership wherever there is a union regardless of the exclusive 
bargaining component. This could, at least in part, explain why the CPS 
figures for union membership are higher, but would not explain why 
the CPS numbers of total employees is so much higher than the payroll 
method. 
Turning to the union viability question, using just the CPS num-
bers would mean that unions are viable bargaining partners. It is diffi-
cult to believe that the Harris dissenters would argue that a union with 
80% of those in the unit paying full dues would be somehow unfit to 
meet the state interest in having a viable bargaining partner. But, in 
category 2, the CPS method shows an 83.2% union membership rate 
while the payroll method is at 28.6%. Category 2 is the situation most 
like the constitutional remedy sought in Friedrichs—mandatory bar-
gaining and a lack of an agency fee. 
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More specifically, under the payroll method, there are states like 
Florida at a 10.5% membership rate and Colorado at 5.5%, even though 
CPS indicates Florida has a union membership rate of 80.1% and Colo-
rado has a rate of 94.3%. Florida and Colorado have the two lowest un-
ion membership rates in category 2 using the payroll methodology. 
The largest state employees’ union in Florida is AFSCME with 
47,653 represented state employees and 1,369 of those employees hav-
ing dues withdrawn by the state.115 The second largest was Teamsters 
Local Union No. 2011, which had 17,909 represented state employees 
and 4,436 of those employees having their dues withdrawn.116 Florida 
Public Employees Council 79 of AFSCME is the signatory of the “Mas-
ter Contract” with the State of Florida.117 It did not file an LM-2. Local 
2011 did file an LM-2, and it claimed that it had 4,456 members, which 
is right in line with the payroll method number.118 
The Master Agreement between Florida and Florida Public Em-
ployees Council 79 indicates that the union is the certified representa-
tive of four separate units and that these certifications occurred in 1976, 
twice in 1978, and once in 1981.119 Thus, this union has been able to 
serve as an exclusive bargaining agent for around four decades without 
an agency fee. 
The Master Agreement between Florida and Teamsters Local Un-
ion No. 2011 indicates that the union was certified in 2011.120 However, 
in December of 2016, as a result of an election, the new certified bar-
gaining agent for this unit became the Police Benevolent Association. 
The Police Benevolent Association had previously represented these 
workers from 1985 to 2011. Thus, this unit has a low membership rate, 
yet unions are actively seeking to represent it. 
Colorado Wins, the state employee union in Colorado, also did not 
file an LM-2. The Colorado certifications occurred in 2008.121 As with 
 
 115 BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 30. 
 116 Id. 
 117 State of Florida and Florida Public Employees Council 79 American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees (Aug. 10 2016–June 30, 2017), Master Contract, http://www. 
dms.myflorida.com/content/download/128685/800846/AFSCME_FY_2016-17_SIGNED_AGREEM 
ENT_for_distribution_andposting-08-23-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2AX-66SG]. 
 118 2015 LM-2 of Teamsters Local 2011 (File No. 544-872), at Schedule 13. 
 119 State of Florida, supra note 117, at 2. 
 120 State of Florida and The Teamsters Loc. Union No. 2011, Agreement, http://www.dms. 
myflorida.com/content/download/86949/497952/SSU_FY_2015-16_Agreement.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/FJN5-E5SD.] However, in December of 2016, as a result of an election the new certified bar-
gaining agent for this unit became the Police Benevolent Association thereby making that unit the 
second largest in Florida. The Police Benevolent Association had previously represented these 
units from 1985 to 2011. Florida Public Employment Relations Commission Certifications 1902, 
1779, and 667. 
 121 Supra note 84. 
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Florida, the low union membership rates have not prevented long-term 
representation of the units by the union. 
Assuming the payroll method membership rate numbers are cor-
rect for Colorado and Florida, it appears that the state employees’ un-
ions in these states have remained viable. Both states have had long-
running unions serve as collective bargaining agents despite no agency 
fees and low membership rates, which calls into question the Harris 
dissenters’ concern that without agency fees a union will not be able to 
“attract sufficient dues to adequately support its functions.” 
Perhaps future research will indicate unions with low membership 
rates like those in Florida and Colorado have been kept viable by sub-
sidies from national unions that have agency-fee requirements. But, in 
the case of Florida and Colorado unions discussed above, only Team-
sters Local Union No. 2011 has filed an LM-2, and that document did 
not disclose such a subsidy. The national AFMSCME LM-2 disclosed 
that Florida Public Employees Council 79 made health insurance pay-
ments to the national organization, but did not receive any subsidies 
from it. But, Colorado Wins is receiving subsidies from the Service Em-
ployees International Union (around $1.1 million) and the American 
Federation of Teachers ($430,817).122 
Oddly, at oral argument in Friedrichs, counsel for the unions and 
the State of California repeatedly forwent direct requests from the Jus-
tices to discuss facts surrounding union viability.123 Further, with Flor-
ida and Colorado, there is no simple explanation why under the payroll 
method their union membership numbers would be so low, while Iowa’s, 
which is also in category 2, is slightly over 50%.124 
Turning to category 4, both the CPS data and the payroll method 
provide some other interesting numbers. The CPS method should have 
all states within this category with CPS coverage numbers of zero by 
definition. But, they do not, somehow measuring thousands of people 
who are members of nonexistent mandatory bargaining unions. This 
failure calls into question the efficacy of the CPS questions and instruc-
tions as it relates to public sector unionism. 
 
 122 SEIU 2016 LM-2 (file number 000-137) at Schedule 15; AFT 2016 LM-2 (file number 000-
012) at Schedule 15. 
 123 Transcript of Oral Argument at 50–52, 56–63, 71–72, 79–80, Friedrichs v. California Teach-
ers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). To the extent that further evidence is required, the 
unions are the best source of the membership and coverage information and if the matter were to 
arise in discovery in future litigation, the trial court should consider the limitations shown here 
under the CPS and payroll methods. 
 124 Michigan’s 84.6% union membership rate under the payroll method is traceable to its long 
history as an agency fee state, a history that only clearly ended in 2015. 
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On union viability, again, the constitutional question presented in 
Friedrichs was whether agency fees must be permitted so that states 
can have viable exclusive representative bargaining partners. Category 
4 is for states that do not have exclusive representatives and therefore 
necessarily do not have agency fees. What is interesting are the num-
bers from North Carolina and Arkansas. In both states, more than 40% 
of all state employees pay union dues voluntarily to a union that is not 
an exclusive bargaining agent. Note too, that these 40% figures are not 
“union membership rates” as defined in this paper. Rather, they are 
voluntary contributors divided by total state employees, whereas the 
union membership rate for categories 1, 2, and 3 is union members di-
vided by total state employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment (obviously less than total state employees). The Arkansas and 
North Carolina payroll method numbers are difficult to reconcile with 
the Harris dissenters’ views as to union viability. But, as with category 
2 of the payroll method, it is difficult to explain why states within cate-
gory 4 have divergent numbers. 
Turning to the question presented in the title of this article, the 
answer is at best unclear. The large gap in the CPS numbers and the 
payroll numbers presents significant doubt about the reliability of the 
CPS public sector unionism numbers.125 These numbers have been col-
lected for decades and are used in more than constitutional litigation. 
At a minimum, this paper should lead the Bureau of Labor Statistics to 
audit its state and local public sector unionism numbers. 
As to the larger constitutional question, the question of the relia-
bility of CPS may be irrelevant. If the CPS union membership numbers 
for category 2 are accurate, union viability cannot seriously be ques-
tioned. But, while the payroll methodology numbers raise concerns 
about the accuracy of the CPS numbers, those same payroll methodol-
ogy numbers provide strong evidence that agency fees are not necessary 
to have a viable union. Even where union membership rates are quite 
low, we see unions that have served as viable collective bargaining 
agents for long periods of time. 
 
 125 Whether these concerns would seep into the CPS private sector union numbers is unknown. 
It may be that private sector union law being uniform throughout the country and well understood, 
there would be less confusion than there is with 50 different legal regimes covering state and local 
public sector unionism. 
